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Abstract:
This paper attempts to analyze the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the 
economic development of East Asian countries during the 1986-2006 period, and to 
determine the links between the FDI-led economic development with changes in exchange 
rate arrangements. It is found that as successful FDI-based industrialization brought 
about enormous changes in industrial structure and economic development, most East 
Asian countries tended to change to more flexible exchange rate arrangements. The 
changes in exchange rate arrangements may be a meaningful indicator for the exchange 
rate policy in Vietnam if it continues to follow the East Asian economic development 
model.
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1.  Introduction
It is undeniable that foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important role in 
the economic development of East Asian countries. FDI contributed significantly to the 
rapid economic growth of East Asia from the mid-1980s until the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis in 
mid-1997; and kept those countries from further collapse during the ﬁ nancial crisis and in 
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fostering post-crisis recovery.
Together with a high economic growth rate brought about by successful FDI-based 
industrialization, the exchange rate systems in most East Asian countries also became 
more ﬂ exible. According to the de facto classiﬁ cation of exchange rate regimes by Reinhart 
and Rogoff [2002] and the IMF’s de facto classiﬁ cation of exchange rate regimes [2003 - 
2006], most East Asian countries changed to more ﬂ exible exchange rate regimes after the 
Asian financial crisis. More specifically, almost all countries had their local currencies 
appreciate against the US dollar during the post-crisis period.
The shift to more ﬂ exible exchange rate systems seems appropriate, since the beneﬁ ts 
of more ﬂ exible exchange rate regimes increase as economies develop and become more 
integrated in global ﬁ nancial markets (see, for example, Rogoff et al [2003], Husain et al 
[2004]). For East Asian economies, moving towards more flexible regimes can help to 
mitigate the risk from currency crises that have characterized pegged exchange rate 
regimes. Moreover, given the huge foreign capital inflows into East Asia, more flexible 
exchange rate regimes allow those countries to conduct more independent monetary policy.
Given the diverse nature of the East Asian group, it is likely that the changes in the 
exchange rate arrangement derive from the common characteristics of this region - the 
FDI-led economic development. In this paper, we attempt to analyze the economic 
development model in East Asian countries and the links between economic fundamentals, 
i.e, the FDI-led, export-oriented industrialization, and exchange rate systems in those 
countries.
To our knowledge, no studies have examined export-oriented industrialization as one 
possible factor determining East Asia’s exchange rate arrangements. Examination of this 
literature gap is meaningful for forecasting future exchange rate arrangements in those 
countries following the same East Asian model of economic development, such as Vietnam. 
As Vietnam is proved to have been following the development path of East Asian countries 
(see, for example, Nguyen and Hirata [2009]), it is expected that Vietnam will experience 
the same changes in its exchange rate arrangement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze the effect of FDI 
on East Asian economic development, including export-oriented industrialization and 
ﬁ nancial development, as well as the links between economic fundamentals and changes 
in exchange rate arrangements in those countries. In section 3 and section 4, we examine 
the exchange rate theories and conduct an empirical analysis on the determinants of 
exchange rate movements in East Asian countries. Section 5 concludes the paper with 
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suggestions for exchange rate arrangements in Vietnam.
2.  East Asian economic development and exchange rate arrangements during 
the 1986-2006 period
Over the last two decades, East Asia has achieved remarkable economic development. 
Besides Japan, the term “economic miracle” also applied to the four East Asian Newly-
Industrialized Economies (NIEs-Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), and in the 
1990s, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and China as growth in these countries accelerated 
to rates approaching those of the NIEs (Ito [2001]). Though Philippines has lagged behind 
its neighbors in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), its economic 
growth rate was relatively comparable to other ASEAN countries in the recent period.
This section examines the FDI-led economic development and the corresponding 
changes in exchange rate arrangements in East Asia; and attempts to explain the links 
from changes in economic fundamentals to exchange rate policy.
2.1 Foreign direct investment and export-oriented industrial development
It seems hard to generalize about the reasons for East Asian economic success given 
the diversity of the group. As pointed out by Ravenhill [1995], the East Asian group in our 
study includes the world’s most populous country, China, and tiny city-states like 
Singapore and Hong Kong; resource-poor Taiwan and resource-rich Indonesia; ethically 
homogenous Korea and multicultural Malaysia. Despite these differences, all these 
countries have more or less relied on FDI to develop their economies. In particular, we 
believe that the key to the East Asian economies’ success lay in their switch to FDI-based, 
export-oriented industrialization.
As indicated in Figure 1 and Figure 2, FDI flows to countries in East Asia have 
gradually trended upward since the mid-1980s, except for Korea and Taiwan in which FDI 
ﬂ ows seemed to rise later and at a much smaller scale. The increasing trend of FDI in East 
Asia from the mid-1980s was a result of a more open attitude of the host countries to 
foreign investment and the internal problems of more advanced countries, including 
Japan. Faced with rising costs, appreciating currencies, and widespread labor shortages, 
investing in regional developing countries seemed to be the appropriate strategy to sustain 
economic growth of advanced economies.
FDI inflow has played a key role in the industrial development of most East Asian 
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countries. With the help of FDI, East Asia has been able to move up the value chain ladder 
in industrial production, from labor-intensive industry like textiles, to higher value-added, 
components-intensive, assembly-based industries, such as automobiles and electronics, 
and ﬁ nally to high-technology, innovation-driven industries, such as advanced microchips.
While enhancing East Asia’s industrial competitiveness, foreign investors have also 
played a key role in the export performance of those countries. With the massive 
participation of foreign companies and their local partners in exports production, share of 
exports in GDP increased over time in East Asia.  As indicated in Table 1, the share of 
exports in GDP rose from 86.1 percent during the 1971-1975 period to 141.3 percent 
during the 2001- 2006 period in Hong Kong; from 136.6 percent during the 1976-1980 
period to 179.2 percent during the 2001-2006 period in Singapore; from 47.7 percent 
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Figure 1: Foreign direct investment ﬂ ows in ASEAN-4
Source: UNCTAD [2007]
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
M
ill
io
n 
U
S$
Hong Kong Singapore Taiwan Korea China
Figure 2: Foreign direct investment ﬂ ows in NIEs and China
Source: UNCTAD [2007]
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during the 1981-1985 period to 51.7 percent during the 2001-2006 period in Taiwan; and 
from 23.3 percent during the 1971-1975 period to 32.9 percent during the 2001-2006 period 
in Korea. In addition, the increased local contents in export values contributed to trade 
surplus being achieved in NIEs. It can be observed from Table 1 that the share of exports 
in GDP surpassed the share of imports in GDP in Hong Kong (from 1971 to 2006), 
Singapore (from 1991 to 2006), Taiwan (from 1981 to 2006), and Korea (from 1986 to 
1990).
Among ASEAN-4 countries, Malaysia and Thailand recorded the most considerable 
increase in the share of exports in GDP. Export share in GDP increased from 40 percent 
during the 1971-1975 period to 98.2 percent during the 2001-2006 period in Malaysia; and 
from 18.5 percent to 56.6 percent in Thailand. On the other hand, Philippines nearly 
doubled its exports share in GDP, from 22.2 percent during the 1971-1975 period to 41.2 
percent during the 2001-2006 period; while Indonesia showed a small increase from 21.5 
percent to 27.6 percent. Although the export share in GDP in China from 2001 to 2006 was 
only 24.8 percent, it was an impressive increase from the share of only 4 percent during 
the 1971-1975 period. While trade surplus was recorded in all time periods in Indonesia 
and Malaysia (except for 1981-1985 and 1991-1995 periods), a trade surplus has occurred 
in Thailand since the 1996-2000 period, and in China since the 1991-1995 period. 
Philippines, on the other hand, incurred a trade deﬁ cit in all time periods (see Table 2).
Table 1: Annual average share of exports and imports in GDP in NIEs
Hong Kong Singapore Taiwan Korea
IM/GDP EX/GDP IM/GDP EX/GDP IM/GDP EX/GDP IM/GDP EX/GDP
1971-75 80.3 86.1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 31.0 23.3
1976-80 83.6 87.4 161.9 136.6 n.a n.a 33.8 29.5
1981-85 93.7 97.6 157.7 134.7 37.8 47.7 34.9 33.2
1986-90 114.3 124.1 148.8 145.6 33.2 45.3 29.8 33.8
1991-95 133.8 137.0 140.4 141.0 34.4 38.6 28.0 27.0
1996-00 131.1 132.2 139.2 153.0 39.6 43.2 33.5 37.3
2001-06 134 141.3 151.8 179.2 45.7 51.7 30.8 32.9
Source: World Development Indicators [2007], International Financial Statistics [2007], Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book [2008]
Note: IM-Imports　　EX-Exports
Table 2: Annual average share of exports and imports in GDP in ASEAN-4 and China
Indonesia Thailand Malaysia Philippines China
IM/GDP EX/GDP IM/GDP EX/GDP IM/GDP EX/GDP IM/GDP EX/GDP IM/GDP EX/GDP
1971-75 18.5 21.5 21.0 18.5 38.8 40.0 22.8 22.2 4.0 4.0
1976-80 20.6 27.4 26.4 21.4 44.6 51.3 25.9 21.2 7.3 7.1
1981-85 23.7 25.7 26.8 22.4 54.7 51.9 25.7 22.7 11.6 11.4
1986-90 21.8 23.4 33.1 31.3 58.5 66.1 27.8 27.4 16.6 16.2
1991-95 25.2 26.7 43.6 38.3 84.8 83.2 38.1 32.1 21.4 22.9
1996-00 31.1 36.6 47.8 54.2 95.4 109.3 54.4 49.7 18.0 21.2
2001-06 22.5 27.6 52.8 56.6 81.1 98.2 44.2 41.2 22.3 24.8
Source: World Development Indicators [2007]
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The trade surplus combined with a massive increase in FDI led to an increasing 
overall balance especially after the 1997 ﬁ nancial crisis. Except for Indonesia, which had 
ﬂ uctuating overall balance of payments, the upward trend of the overall balance in other 
countries has appeared more obvious since 2002 (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).
2.2 Financial development
This successful FDI-based industrial development and export performance resulted in 
remarkable economic growth rate in East Asia. From 1981 to 1995, the real GDP annual 
growth rate averaged at 7.6 percent for NIEs and 6 percent for ASEAN-4 (WDI [2008] and 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book [2008]). Meanwhile, China recorded a 10.3 percent annual 
GDP growth rate during the same period (WDI [2008]). On the other hand, ASEAN-4’s real 
GDP per capital growth rates nearly approached those of the NIEs during 1991-1995. On 
average, ASEAN-4’s real GDP per capita growth rate in 1991-1995 was 4.9 percent, while 
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Figure 3: The overall balance of payments of NIEs during 1986-2006
Source: The IMF’s International Financial Statistics [2007], Taiwan Statistical Data Book [2008]
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Figure 4: The overall balance of payments of ASEAN during 1986-2006
Source: The IMF’s International Financial Statistics [2007]
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NIEs recorded 5.4 percent (WDI [2008] and Taiwan Statistical Data Book [2008]). China, 
on the other hand, recorded an 11 percent real GDP per capita growth rate in the same 
period (WDI [2008]).
It seems reasonable to expect that the FDI-driven economic growth set up the 
foundation for the development of ﬁ nancial markets in East Asian countries, despite the 
outbreak of the Asian financial crisis which was partly caused by weak financial 
management in some countries. Yet, with the strong economic foundation established in 
the pre-crisis period, East Asian financial markets could recover and return to the 
development track quickly.
According to Ghosh [2006], the banking efﬁ ciency in East Asian countries improved 
considerably in the period after the 1997 ﬁ nancial crisis. Though data on nonperforming 
loan ratio are only available for the 2000-2006 period, those data showed the improved 
efﬁ ciency in banking operations.
Table 3: Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (Unit: Percentage)
Korea Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand China
2000 8.9 3.4 34.4 15.4 24 17.7 22.4
2001 3.4 8 31.9 17.8 27.7 11.5 29.8
2002 2.4 7.7 24 15.8 26.5 16.5 25.6
2003 2.6 6.7 19.4 13.9 26.1 13.5 20.1
2004 1.9 5 14.2 11.8 24.7 11.8 15.6
2005 1.2 3.8 15.6 9.9 20 11.1 10.5
2006 1 3 13 8 8 8 9.8
Source: World Development Indicators [2007]
As shown in Table 3, the nonperforming loans to total gross loans ratio decreased in 
all East Asian countries during the 2000-2006 period. Among those countries, Korea had 
the lowest nonperforming loans ratio of 1 percent in 2006; while Indonesia recorded the 
highest nonperforming loans ratio of 13 percent, down from 34.4 percent in 2000. On the 
other hand, operations of central banks in East Asian countries could be comparable to 
those in industrialized countries. Central bank operations in those countries reflect a 
common long-term trend toward greater transparency and a stronger market orientation 
in policy implementation (Borio and McCauley[2002]).
As another indicator of ﬁ nancial development, equity markets in Asian countries, as 
measured by stock market capitalization, grew signiﬁ cantly during the 1997-2006 period. 
In the region as a whole, the market almost tripled from 1997 to 2006 (Ghosh [2006]). As 
indicated in Table 4, the ratio of market capitalization of listed companies over GDP 
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surged in all six countries between 1997 and 2006.  While stock markets in the region 
were still considerably smaller than in the United States, United Kingdom, or Germany, in 
relation to the size of domestic economies, they compared favorably to the markets of 
advanced industrial countries. Indeed, stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP 
in 2006 was actually larger in Singapore than Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
the United States (see Table 4).
Table 4: Market capitalization of listed companies/GDP
Country 1997 2006
Korea 9 94
Singapore 111 202
Indonesia 13 38
Malaysia 93 150
Philippines 38 58
Thailand 16 68
Japan 52 108
Germany 38 56
United Kingdom 149 158
United States 137 148
Source: World Development Indicators [2007]
Starting from a much smaller base, bond markets grew even more rapidly over the 
1997-2006 period. As can be seen from Table 5, the ratio of domestic bonds outstanding 
over GDP increased remarkably from 1997 to 2004. The size of bond markets over GDP in 
some Asian countries was comparable to (or even higher than) more advanced countries. 
For example, in 2004, the ratio of domestic bonds outstanding over GDP in Germany and 
the United Kingdom was lower than that in Malaysia and Korea (see Table 5).
Table 5: Size of bond markets (Domestic bonds outstanding)
1997 2004
Economy/Region US$ billions %GDP US$ billions %GDP
Indonesia 4.5 1.9 57.7 22.7
Korea 130.3 25.1 568.3 83.2
Malaysia 57 57 106.6 90
Philippines 18.5 22.3 25 28.8
Thailand 10.7 7.1 66.5 41.1
Singapore 23.7 24.7 78.6 73.1
Japan 4,433.60 97.6 8,866.70 197.7
Germany 1,739.70 44.5 2225.7 81.2
United Kingdom 777.7 23.5 1,040.80 48.8
United States 12,656.90 62.9 19,186.60 161.6
Source: Ghosh [2006]
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2.3 Exchange rate policy
Along with the increase in FDI flows and the resulting economic development, 
exchange rates in East Asian countries showed some notable movements.
First, except for China, Hong Kong and Malaysia, East Asian countries seemed to 
adopt more ﬂ exible exchange rate regimes after the 1997 Asian ﬁ nancial crisis. According 
to the de facto classification of exchange rate regimes by Reinhart and Rogoff [2002], 
Thailand adopted a managed ﬂ oating exchange rate regime in January 1998, in which the 
value of the baht was determined by market forces and the Bank of Thailand would 
intervene in the market only when necessary to avoid excessive volatilities. The 
Philippines and Singapore adopted a managed floating system in December 1997 and 
December 1998, respectively; while South Korea and Indonesia moved to freely ﬂ oating 
exchange rate systems in July 1998 and April 1999, respectively. Malaysia was an 
exception as it turned to the ﬁ xed exchange rate system in September 1998.
As another proof of the move to more flexible exchange rate systems in East Asian 
countries, the IMF’s de facto classiﬁ cation of exchange rate regimes from 2003 to 2006 put 
Thailand and Singapore in the category of a managed floating system with no pre-
determined path for the exchange rate; and Philippines and South Korea in the category of 
an independently ﬂ oating system. Moreover, Indonesia was put into a managed ﬂ oating 
system during the 2003-2005 period, but was classified as an independently floating 
system in 2006. In addition, Malaysia was put into ﬁ xed pegged arrangements during the 
2003-2005 period but was classiﬁ ed as a managed ﬂ oating system in 2006 (see Table 6).
Table 6: De facto classiﬁ cation of exchange rate regimes
Country R&R [2002] IMF  [2003] IMF [2004] IMF [2005] IMF [2006]
South Korea IF IF IF IF IF
Singapore MF MF MF MF MF
Hong Kong CB CB CB CB CB
Thailand MF MF MF MF MF
Philippines MF IF IF IF IF
Indonesia IF MF MF MF IF
Malaysia FP FP FP FP MF
China FP FP FP FP FP
Notes:-R&R [2002]: the de facto classification of exchange rate regimes by Reinhart and 
Rogoff [2002]
   -CB: currency board arrangement
   -MF: Managed ﬂ oating with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate
   -IF: Independently ﬂ oating
   -FP: Fixed peg arrangement
   -Information on the classiﬁ cation of exchange rate system in Taiwan is not available.
   Source: Reinhart and Rogoff [2002] and IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks
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On the other hand, more information can be revealed by observing the real exchange 
rate index of East Asian countries. While the trend in exchange rate movements may 
differ between NIEs and ASEAN-4 countries during the pre-crisis period, it seems that 
local currencies of both NIEs and ASEAN-4 countries appreciated against the US dollar in 
the post-crisis period, except for the case of Hong Kong and China (see Figure 5 and Figure 
6).
From the analysis in the above sections, it is likely that exchange rate movements in 
East Asia derived from the underlying economic development, which was led by FDI 
inflows in those countries. First, the surplus overall balance resulted from tremendous 
export performances and FDI inflows in East Asian countries created a pressure for 
appreciating local currencies. As indicated in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4, 
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the FDI inflows and the overall balance surplus increased tremendously in East Asian 
countries since 2001-2002. Hence, we can observe the local currency appreciation against 
the US dollar in most countries in the post-crisis period.
Second, as discussed in section 2.1, FDI inflows played a key role in upgrading the 
industrial production in East Asian countries to higher value chains. As industrial exports 
become more sophisticated and contain more added value, a more ﬂ exible exchange rate is 
unlikely to harm export competitiveness. In other words, the dependence of export 
competitiveness on exchange rate is likely to be lower when exports are highly value-
added, such as microchips, than when they are simple, labor-intensive products, such as 
apparel.
Third, it seems that as long as the domestic production is less reliant on imported 
intermediate and capital inputs, maintenance of a ﬂ exible exchange rate system is more 
feasible. Indeed, the fixed exchange rate system seems necessary when domestic 
production depends heavily on imported inputs, since the depreciation of local currency 
increases import cost and may harm the export sector.
Fourth, FDI-led economic development also facilitated the maintenance of more 
flexible exchange rate regimes. As discussed in section 2.2, East Asian economic 
development was associated with the development of the financial system. As the 
soundness of the banking system is improved, commercial banks are better prepared to 
cope with the shocks created by exchange rate ﬂ uctuations (e.g, by hedging activities). On 
the other hand, the increased capacity of central banks and the development of capital 
markets which approached the standard of more advanced countries show that East Asia 
have established the financial infrastructure necessary for maintaining more flexible 
exchange rate systems.
Finally, since East Asian economies have been driven by, and to some extent, depend 
heavily on foreign investment, those economies are more likely to experience ﬂ uctuations 
when foreign investment ﬂ ows are unstable; or when there are changes in the economic 
structure caused by foreign investors. As the economy may be faced with more instability 
associated with FDI inflows, it seems more difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
system.
3.  Theoretical considerations
Literatures on exchange rate theories have long debated on the merits of ﬁ xed versus 
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ﬂ oating exchange rates. The debate has focused on the advantages and disadvantages of 
both the fixed and floating exchange rate system, indicating the possibility of adopting 
intermediate regimes. Recently, the debates on exchange rate regimes have become 
focused on whether or not exchange rate regimes are moving to a corner solution with the 
“hard peg” or the “free ﬂ oat”. The corner solution has often been explained by the principle 
of the Impossible Trinity, that is, a country has to give up one of three goals: exchange rate 
stability, monetary independence, and ﬁ nancial market integration (Taguchi [2007]). As 
capital market integration increases, countries would be forced increasingly to more pure 
ﬂ oating or more purely ﬁ xed regimes. On the other hand, the “Fear of ﬂ oating” hypothesis 
is a counter-argument against the “corner solution” hypothesis. According to recent 
studies, few developing countries that claim to be implementing a ﬂ oating exchange rate 
policy, do in fact allow their exchange rate to ﬂ oat (Calvo and Reinhart [2000a and 2000b]). 
“Fear of floating” is explained largely by the fact that exchange rate volatility is more 
damaging to trade, and the pass-through from exchange rate swings to inflation is far 
higher in developing countries (Calvo and Reinhart [2000b]). Fear of appreciating because 
of short-term capital inﬂ ows and losing competitiveness is also a factor for not letting the 
exchange rate ﬂ oat freely (Yagci [2001]).
A large number of studies have researched on the determinants of the choice of 
exchange rate regime. The standard classical theory of choosing an exchange rate regime 
is the theory of optimum currency area (OCA theory) pioneered by Mundell [1961]. Notable 
followers, who further developed Mundell’s ideas, are Fleming [1962] and McKinnon 
[1963]. An optimum currency area is defined as a geographical area in which member 
countries should use absolutely ﬁ xed exchange rates among themselves or, equivalently, 
have a common currency. Mundell and his followers have stipulated several criteria to 
assess whether a country should belong to an optimal currency area, such as the degree of 
labor mobility, the degree of openness and the size of the economy.
More recently, a large theoretical literature has examined the optimal choice of 
exchange rate regime so as to stabilize macroeconomic performance in a world with 
different types of shocks. The basic conclusion of these studies is that the optimal choice of 
regime depends on the nature and size of these shocks, as well as on the structure of the 
economy (e.g., see Flood [1979], Frenkel and Aizenman [1981]). These analyses tend to 
imply that countries which experience large foreign price shocks should choose flexible 
exchange rates, while domestic monetary and demand shocks should be financed out of 
reserves, with no need for exchange rate adjustment.
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In addition to the above-mentioned theories, political economy theory emphasizes 
political factors such as political stability and the government’s temptation to inﬂ ate as 
important criteria influencing the choice of exchange rate regime (e.g. Collins [1996], 
Edwards [1996]). The theories show that a country lacking political stability has an 
incentive ceteris paribus to let its exchange rate ﬂ oat as it lacks the political ability and 
political support for the unpopular measures that may be required to defend a peg. Also, 
under a ﬂ oating regime, exchange rate adjustments are less highly visible to the public 
and consequently less politically costly than devaluation under a peg (Collins [1996]). 
Finally, a government with an “ambitious” unemployment objective has a high temptation 
to inﬂ ate, and thus ceteris paribus a high incentive to “tie its own hands” by pegging the 
exchange rate (Edwards [1996]).
Taking into account various theories on exchange rate regime, we now determine the 
position of this paper in the literature. First, we follow the “Fear of ﬂ oating” hypothesis, 
because of the fact that most East Asian countries moved to managed floating system, 
instead of pure ﬂ oating one. The shifts to intermediate regimes seem reasonable, given the 
disadvantages of both corner solutions. Though the main advantages of the floating 
regimes are their invulnerability to currency crisis, and their ability to absorb adverse 
shocks and pursue an independent monetary policy, these advantages come with the cost 
of high short-term exchange rate volatility and large medium-term swings characterized 
by misalignment. At the other end of the spectrum, the hard peg regimes provide 
maximum stability and credibility for monetary policy, and low transaction costs and 
interest rates, but suffer from the loss of lender of last resort of the central bank and 
seigniorage revenue.
Two big advantages of the intermediate regimes are that they maintain stability and 
reduce transaction costs and the exchange rate risk while providing a nominal anchor for 
monetary policy. As argued by Yagci [2001]), by giving up some nominal stability for 
greater ﬂ exibility, the intermediate regimes aim to get the best of both worlds: to provide 
limited nominal anchor for inflationary expectations, but also avoid volatility and 
overvaluation, and reduce the risk of currency crisis by restoring two-way bet for 
speculators with broad soft bands.
Second, we then focus on examining the determinants of exchange rate ﬂ exibility in 
East Asian countries. Our speciﬁ c concern is whether FDI and the FDI-led, export-oriented 
industrialization had any effects on the local currency appreciation against the US dollar; 
as well as on the exchange rate ﬂ exibility in the East Asia region.
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4.  The regression model
This section attempts to check the determinants of exchange rate arrangements in 
some East Asian countries. We use data from 1986 to 2006, and run the regression for 
seven countries in the region, including South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan 1).
Most empirical studies used economic fundamentals as determinants of exchange rate 
regimes. Table 7 summarizes the determinant variables of exchange rate regimes used in 
previous studies. As can be observed from Table 7, besides the traditional economic 
determinants, other types of explanatory variables, which are political variables and 
financial development, were examined in some empirical studies (see, for example, 
Edwards [1996], Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein [2000], Poirson [2001], and Hossain [2009] 
with the inclusion of political variables, and Hagen and Zhou [2002] with the examination 
of ﬁ nancial development as an explanatory variable). However, no studies have included 
FDI as an explanatory variable.
Table 7: Explanatory variables used in previous studies
No Variables Proxies Regression studies
1 Scale of the 
economy
GNP, GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate Heller [1978], Holden, Holden 
and Suss [1979], Melvin [1985], 
Collins[1996], Edwards [1996], 
Rizzo [1998], Poirson [2001], 
Hagen and Zhou [2002], 
Hossain [2009]
2 Openness Imports/GNP, Exports plus Imports / GDP Heller [1978], Holden, Holden 
and Suss [1979], Melvin [1985], 
Collins[1996], Rizzo [1998], 
Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein 
[2000],
Poirson [2001], Hagen and Zhou 
[2002], Duttagupta and Otker-
Robe [2003], Hossain [2009]
3 Liberalized trade Assign a value of 1 to cases where the average tariff 
was lower than 20%
Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein 
[2000]
4 Terms of trade Collins[1996], Rizzo [1998]
5 Export 
performance
Annual growth in export revenue Duttagupta and Otker-Robe 
[2003]
6 Geographical 
concentration of 
foreign trade
The fraction of total trade accounted for by the 
dominant trading partners
Heller [1978], Holden, Holden 
and Suss [1979], Melvin [1985], 
Rizzo [1998], Poirson [2001], 
Hagen and Zhou [2002]
7 Commodity 
concentration of 
foreign trade
Share of main exports in total exports Holden, Holden and Suss [1979], 
Poirson [2001], Hagen and Zhou 
[2002]
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8 Inﬂ ation, 
Inﬂ ation 
differential
Inﬂ ation rate; The difference between a country’s 
inﬂ ation and the weighted average inﬂ ation of its 
trading partners (or the average inﬂ ation rate for the 
world as a whole)
Heller [1978], Holden, Holden 
and Suss [1979], Melvin [1985], 
Collins [1996], Rizzo [1998], 
Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein 
[2000], Poirson [2001],Hagen 
and Zhou [2002]
9 Capital mobility Annual gross private capital ﬂ ows to GDP; dummies 
that indicates the existence (or levels) of restrictions on 
capital account transactions
Holden, Holden and Suss [1979], 
Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein 
[2000], Poirson [2001], Hossain 
[2009]
10 Foreign price 
shocks
The standard errors of residuals from regressions of the 
exchange rate-adjusted inﬂ ation rates of the country’s 
major trading partner
Melvin [1985]
11 Domestic shocks The standard errors of second-order autoregressive 
equations on the percentage change in money; dummies 
for balance of payments crises, banking crises, 
recessions, high inﬂ ation periods and hyperinﬂ ation
Melvin [1985], Hossain [2009]
12 External shocks The lagged value of the coefﬁ cient of variation of real 
export growth; the coefﬁ cient of variation of real 
bilateral exchange rate changes; the interactive term 
between external variability and the degree of 
openness, where the degree of openness was deﬁ ned as 
the ratio of imports plus exports to GNP; the coefﬁ cient 
of variation of the terms of trade.
Edwards [1996], Frieden, 
Ghezzi and Stein [2000]
13 Vulnerability to 
external shocks
Ratio of international debt securities issued in own 
currency to total issued in all currencies; ratio of bank 
debt in own currency to total bank debt in all 
currencies; ratio of total foreign securities issued in the 
country’s currency to total foreign securities issued by 
the country
Poirson [2001]
14 Risk of currency 
crisis
Non-gold international reserves/broad money; 
government ﬁ scal budget balance/GDP
Hagen and Zhou [2002]
15 Volatility of 
exchange rate
Volatility of real exchange rate changes; the deviation 
of the real effective exchange rate (REER) from its 
trend
Hagen and Zhou [2002], 
Duttagupta and Otker-Robe 
[2003]
16 Probability of 
abandoning the 
peg
Historical rate of inﬂ ation; the yearly lagged ratio of 
international reserves to high powered money; rate of 
growth of domestic credit; index of capital control
Edwards [1996]
17 Exchange rate 
misalignment
Current account balance/GDP Collins[1996], Rizzo [1998]
18 Reserves Foreign currency reserves/GDP, Central bank reserves/
M2, Reserves/ Imports
Rizzo [1998], Frieden, Ghezzi 
and Stein [2000], Poirson [2001], 
Duttagupta and Otker-Robe 
[2003]
19 Dollarization Foreign currency deposits/broad money Poirson [2001]
20 Expansionary 
monetary policy
Credit to the private sector or total domestic credit in 
percentage of GDP, growth of base money in percentage 
of GDP
Duttagupta and Otker-Robe 
[2003]
21 Fiscal 
vulnerability
Government revenue/GDP, government expenditure/
GDP, government deﬁ cit/GDP, annual growth of 
government borrowings from the banking system
Rizzo [1998], Duttagupta and 
Otker-Robe [2003]
22 Financial sector 
development
Broad money/GDP, Foreign assets of the banking 
system/Money supply
Heller [1978], Hagen and Zhou 
[2002], Hossain [2009]
23 Dummy variable 
for an IMF 
program
to see whether the shift to an alternative type of 
exchange rate regime is related to “IMF advice” under 
an economic program
Duttagupta and Otker-Robe 
[2003], Hossain [2009]
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24 Interest group 
variable
Share of each sector in the country’s GDP Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein 
[2000]
25 Institutional 
variable
Degree of central bank independence Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein 
[2000]
26 Political 
variables
Frequency of government change; changes in the 
political leadership from the governing party to an 
opposition party; the share of government seats in the 
legislature; the effective number of parties in the 
legislature; number of revolutions
Edwards [1996], Frieden, 
Ghezzi and Stein [2000], 
Poirson [2001], Hossain [2009]
27 Spell duration Spell is deﬁ ned as a time when there is a particular 
ﬁ xed value of a country’s currency with respect to the 
US dollar. The authors set the condition that the ﬁ xed 
exchange rate must last for at least three months to 
constitute a spell. Exits to less ﬂ exible regimes are 
associated with relatively long spell duration (compared 
with other exits)
Duttagupta and Otker-Robe 
[2003]
In this paper, we examine the determinants of exchange rate arrangements in East 
Asia during the 1986-2006 period. Since FDI-led economic development seems to be the 
common feature of East Asian economies, we examine the effect of this common feature on 
exchange rate regimes of those countries. As analyzed in section 2, the FDI inﬂ ow and the 
FDI-led, export-oriented industrialization can have effects on exchange rate regimes. 
Although we cannot quantify and include all FDI-related factors in the regression (such as 
the higher value-added industrial production in East Asian countries), we try to examine 
the effects of the FDI inflow itself, the overall balance, and financial development on 
exchange rates. In addition, other common explanatory variables of exchange rate 
movements are also included. As a result, the independent variables include the real 
overall balance (in 1985 US$) (ROB), real FDI inﬂ ow (in 1985 US$) (FDI), real GDP per 
capita (in 2000 US$) (GDPPC), openness of the economy ((Export+Import)/GDP as the 
proxy) (OPEN), inflation rate (INF), financial development (proxied by the ratio of M2/
GDP) (FIN), and real interest rate (RIR). Besides, dummy variables for each country are 
also added.
As for the dependent variable, most studies of the determinants of exchange rate 
regimes use the de jure classiﬁ cation of exchange rate regimes in the IMF Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions to create their dependent variable. 
However, the de jure classification of a regime by the IMF is problematic as many 
countries ofﬁ cially declare one regime (de jure) but in practice maintain another regime (de
facto). In addition, the de facto classification made by the IMF has only been available 
since 2003. Therefore, instead of using the classiﬁ cation by the IMF, we try to quantify the 
dependent variable.
Determinants of exchange rate arrangements in East Asia and lessons for Vietnam（Kim・Hirata） 113
The exchange rate ﬂ exibility was quantiﬁ ed in two recent papers by Taguchi [2007] 
and Poirson [2001]. Taguchi [2007] calculates the coefficient of variation (CV) in the 
monthly nominal exchange rates of the sample countries year by year 2).  CV is useful for 
comparing data sets with widely different means since it is a dimensionless number. 
However, CV is merely a mathematical measure of exchange rate ﬂ exibility which does not 
reflect the level of intervention by the central banks. A small value of CV does not tell 
whether the exchange rate stability is the result of interventions by the central bank, or 
just the result of macroeconomic stability without any exchange rate intervention. 
Therefore, besides CV, we also use another way to quantify the dependent variable. 
Following the approach of Poirson [2001], we measure the degree of de facto exchange rate 
ﬂ exibility (FLT) by the ratio of the average absolute value of monthly nominal exchange 
rate depreciation (ME) to the average absolute value of the monthly change in reserves 
normalized by the monetary base in the previous month (MR), in order to proxy for the 
monetary impact of these changes. The rationale for using FLT as an indicator of de facto
exchange rate flexibility is that if MR is high relative to ME (and therefore FLT is 
comparatively small) the monetary authorities are intervening relatively heavily on the 
foreign exchange market to offset market forces. FLT assumes values ranging from zero to 
inﬁ nity, with the limits being deﬁ ned by a perfectly pegged policy at the one end (ME = 0) 
and a completely intervention-free policy at the other (MR = 0).
Finally, we also check the factors that determine the real exchange rate index (RERI). 
We calculate the real exchange rate index (with the value of the real exchange rate in 1985 
equals 100) and use it as the dependent variable.
In the ﬁ rst two regressions, only six countries are included since we lack the monthly 
data of exchange rate (which are necessary to calculate CV and FLT) for Taiwan. In the 
third regression, Taiwan is included. Therefore, in the first two regressions, dummy 
variables for countries include DK, DS, DI, DM, DP, which represent Korea, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines, respectively. In the final regression, the dummy 
variable for Thailand (DT) is added.
Data used in the regression are collected and calculated from the International 
Financial Statistics [2008], Taiwan Statistical Data Book [2008] and the World 
Development Indicators 2007 CD-ROM.
From the discussion in section 2, the expected signs of the coefﬁ cients of the three key 
explanatory variables are as follows: ROB and RFDI are expected to have negative 
relation with log(RERI), which means the overall balance and FDI would lead to the 
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appreciation of the local currency against the US dollar; while RFDI and FIN are expected 
to be positively related to both log(CV) and log(FLT), which implies the positive effects of 
FDI and ﬁ nancial development on exchange rate ﬂ exibility.
The results of the three regressions are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Regression results
Regression 1 2 3
Dependent variable Log(CV) Log(FLT) Log(RERI)
Const -6.77
(0.00)
-2.52
(0.01)
3.29
(0.00)
ROB(-1) -5.00
(0.02)
-8.00
(0.66)
-8.95
(0.02)
RFDI(-1) 6.32
(0.35)
4.26
(0.49)
-2.02
(0.06)
GDPPC -0.0001
(0.12)
-2.02
(0.78)
1.84
(0.20)
OPEN 0.39
(0.46)
-0.18
(0.74)
0.12
(0.12)
INF(-1) 0.01
(0.46)
0.02
(0.45)
-0.007
(0.03)
FIN 2.56
(0.00)
1.15
(0.16)
0.52
(0.00)
RIR(-1) -0.01
(0.55)
-0.04
(0.23)
-0.01
(0.00)
DK 1.44
(0.06)
0.03
(0.96)
0.42
(0.00)
DS 1.32
(0.35)
-0.25
(0.84)
0.2
(0.38)
DI 1.64
(0.00)
1.70
(0.02)
1.73
(0.00)
DM -0.72
(0.11)
-3.05
(0.00)
0.78
(0.00)
DP 1.73
(0.00)
0.79
(0.26)
1.26
(0.00)
DT 0.89
(0.00)
Observations 104 62 107
R2 0.28 0.54 0.77
Note: The numbers in the brackets are p-value
As can be observed from Table 8, the R-squared in the ﬁ rst and second regressions are 
relatively small. In the first regression, we use CV as the dependent variable. The 
disadvantage of using CV as mentioned above is probably the reason why R-squared in the 
ﬁ rst regression is rather low.
In the second regression, we use FLT as the dependent variable. FLT seems to be a 
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better indicator of exchange rate intervention than CV. However, the number of 
observations in the second regression (only 62 observations) is low since we do not have 
full data of the monthly monetary base necessary to calculate FLT in some countries like 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Our R-squared is therefore only 0.54, though higher 
than the R-squared of the ﬁ rst regression.
On the other hand, all the key variables have the expected signs. The effect of the real 
overall balance on real exchange rate index is statistically significant and negative, 
suggesting that the higher overall balance, the higher the value of local currency. The FDI 
inflow has the same effect on the real exchange rate index, and the coefficient is also 
statistically signiﬁ cant. On the other hand, both FDI and ﬁ nancial development matter for 
the choice of exchange rate regime: countries that receive more FDI inﬂ ows and countries 
that have more developed financial system tend to adopt more flexible exchange rate 
systems. The coefficients are positive for both indexes of exchange rate flexibility, and 
statistically signiﬁ cant for the ﬁ nancial development variable. However, the coefﬁ cients 
are not statistically signiﬁ cant for the FDI variable, probably because the lag of one year is 
not enough to show clearly the effects of FDI on exchange rate ﬂ exibility. It may take more 
time before the inﬂ uence of FDI to changes in industrial production, the trade structure, 
and ﬁ nally to exchange rate ﬂ exibility, become obvious.
As for the dummy variables, the coefﬁ cients are statistically signiﬁ cant in at least two 
regressions in all countries, except for Singapore. The regression result for Singapore is 
not unexpected, however, since Singapore’s economy is not dominated by export-oriented 
manufacturing. In fact, FDI is larger in services in Singapore than in manufacturing. The 
manufacturing sector’s share declined during the 1990s from 41.4 percent in 1990 to 36.5 
percent in 2001 (Yue [2006]). Meanwhile, the service sector, including financial and 
business services, commerce, transport and storage services increasingly lured foreign 
investment, even from regional investors. According to Yue [2006], 68 percent of Japanese 
FDI and more than 90 percent of FDI from ASEAN countries were in Singapore’s 
nonmanufacturing sector. With its small scale and service-oriented economic development, 
Singapore (and perhaps Hong Kong) may not entirely fit into our FDI-based, export-
oriented manufacturing model of development, and therefore, Singapore’s exchange rate 
arrangement may have to be explained by other factors not included in our regression 
analysis.
On the other hand, the coefficients for Malaysia are negative in the first two 
regressions, which mean that other things equal, FDI and ﬁ nancial development have less 
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effect on exchange rate flexibility. As for Malaysia, the heavy dependence on imported 
inputs due to fragile links between local producers and foreign partners may be one reason 
underlying the inﬂ exibility of the exchange rate system. In addition, during the post-crisis 
period, many large, state-nurtured and state-supported Malaysian entrepreneurs failed 
due to lack of accountability, transparency and appropriate corporate governance (Ling 
[2006]). Given the fact that those state corporations were the major local partners of 
foreign investors, local links did not seem to improve even in the post-crisis period.
For other countries, at least one coefﬁ cient in the ﬁ rst two regressions is statistically 
signiﬁ cant, and both coefﬁ cients in the ﬁ rst two regressions are positive. Therefore, to our 
knowledge and currently available information, we may argue that most East Asian 
countries ﬁ t into our model of industrialization-based exchange rate arrangements. While 
we acknowledge that there can be other models explaining exchange rate arrangements in 
East Asian countries; and other variables should be included in later studies to examine 
more sophisticated effects of FDI-led economic development on exchange rates, our 
analysis and empirical studies have at least pointed out a reasonable explanation for 
exchange rate arrangements in East Asia.
5.  Concluding remarks
The discussions in previous sections show that as FDI inﬂ ows increased and export-
oriented industrialization process was realized, most East Asian countries shifted to more 
ﬂ exible exchange rate regimes. Our regression results conﬁ rm the positive effect of FDI on 
exchange rate ﬂ exibility and currency appreciation.
As Vietnam has been following the development path of East Asian countries, 
especially in terms of regional FDI attraction and the FDI-based, export-oriented 
industrialization, our analysis and regression results can be used to predict the future 
exchange rate arrangement in Vietnam. There maybe two scenarios for Vietnam’s 
exchange rate policy. In the ﬁ rst scenario, if Vietnam accelerates its FDI-based, export-
oriented industrialization, then the Vietnamese Dong (VND) is likely to appreciate and the 
exchange rate management system is likely to become more flexible. In the second 
scenario, if Vietnam fails to realize the export-oriented industrialization and returns to the 
previous phase of development (in which the huge trade deficit remains and must be 
financed by foreign capital inflows), then it is expected that the VND will gradually 
depreciate, and the current exchange rate management will have to be maintained.
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From the lessons of East Asian countries, the future exchange rate arrangement in 
Vietnam will depend a great deal on the result of the FDI attraction policy and the 
industrialization process, among other possible factors. In other words, the level of future 
exchange rate ﬂ exibility depends on the economic development prospects of Vietnam.
Notes
1 ）Full data on Hong Kong are not available so we exclude Hong Kong in our regression 
analysis. Also, we do not include China in our regression due to its large-scale and recent 
development compared to NIEs and ASEAN-4 countries.
2 ）The coefficient of variation (CV) is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability 
distribution and is deﬁ ned as the ratio of the standard deviationσ to the meanμ .
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